Using China's provincial economic and pollution data from 1992 to 2008, we employ data envelope analysis (DEA) and econometric analyses to explicitly estimate technical efficiency and examine the role of technical efficiency, pollution control instruments (pollution levy and pollution quantity control), and prices of production inputs on pollution intensity. We find that an increase of labor wage and/or a decrease of capital cost are associated with an improvement in technical efficiency. The levy rates of air pollution improve technical efficiency but pollution quantity control targets have no statistically significant effect on technical efficiency. On the other hand, technical efficiency, the effective levy rates, pollution quantity control targets, and capital cost have a negative effect but wage has a positive effect on pollution intensity. The importance of production input prices in pollution intensity and technical efficiency suggests alternative channels for industrial pollution control as well as cautions for the unintended consequence on the environment if any policy changes are made relating to labor and capital costs.
Introduction
In the last three decades China's economic growth has dwarfed all other economies worldwide with its higher than ten percent annual economic growth rate. China's economic growth has significantly improved living standards, but it also brought serious damage and degradation to its environment. According to a 2007 report released by the Blacksmith Institute, six of the World's 30 most polluted cities were in China (BlackSmithInstitute, 2007) .
2 Approximately 43% of China's major cities did not meet its category II air-quality standards in 2006 (SEPA, 2006 3 and 74% of the Chinese population lived in areas where the air quality did not meet the WHO standards in 2002 (WHO, 2005 . Industry, which contributes approximately half of China's GDP, is the primary source of water and air pollution. If left uncontrolled, the environmental damage will be so severe that it will become a bottle-neck for sustainable economic growth.
Recognizing the danger of worsening environmental quality and the increasing demand for better ambient environmental quality, the Chinese government has implemented various policies and invested in technological improvement. As a main pillar of the pollution control system, the levy system was first introduced in the Provisional China Environment Protection Law (EPL) enacted in 1979 and significantly revised in 2003 to provide better incentives for pollution control. In 2006 China implemented quantity control on COD (Chemical Oxygen Demand) and SO 2 (sulfur dioxide) discharge. The target of the quantity control is to reduce major pollutant discharges of COD and SO 2 by ten percent relative to the 2005 levels by the end of the 11 th Five-Year Plan Period (2006 -2010 .
3 data from 1992 to 2008, the estimated technical efficiency based on data envelope analysis (DEA) exhibits significant regional differences. Based on the econometric analyses of technical efficiency and pollution intensity, we find that an increase in the pollution levy rates and labor wage or a decrease in capital cost is associated with an improvement in technical efficiency. On the other hand, technical efficiency, effective levy rates, pollution quantity control targets, and capital cost have a negative effect but wage has a positive effect on pollution intensity. The importance of production input prices in technical efficiency and pollution intensity suggests alternative channels for industrial pollution control and calls for cautions regarding the unintended consequences on the environment if any policy changes are made relating to labor and capital costs. Pollution quantity control targets effectively reduce pollution intensity but they do not improve technical efficiency, while the effective levy rates for air pollution are negatively associated with both pollution intensity and technical efficiency. The results suggest that pollution levy, a market-based instrument, may work better than command-based instruments like pollution quantity control as the former gives polluters an incentive to improve technical efficiency that leads to a long-run improvement in pollution control.
Background of China's pollution control system and policy changes
China began to implement environmental regulations as early as the 1970s. A series of pollution control regulations were implemented and enforced at the national, provincial, and local levels following the first Provisional EPL enacted in 1979. The policy spectrum ranges from command-and-control instruments to economic incentives and voluntary pollution control (see details in section 2.3).
China's pollution levy system
The pollution levy system has always been a centerpiece of China's pollution regulations. 4 Article 18 of the EPL stated that "the levy should be imposed on pollution discharges which exceed national pollution discharge standards, based on quantity and concentration of discharges and levy fee schedules established by the State Council." By the end of 1981, 27
out of a total of 29 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in China started to implement the levy system. In February 1982 China issued an "Interim Procedure on
Pollution Charges" (hereafter Procedure). The Procedure defined objectives, levy standards, collection methods, and principles for use of the levy collected. The nationwide implementation of the levy system followed the passage of the Procedure --discharge of wastewater, waste gas, and solid wastes that are higher than the standards were subject to the levy.
The evolution of the levy system has two distinct periods, pre-and post-2003 regimes.
The pre-2003 levy system classifies firms into compliant and noncompliant firms. We denote an individual firm's concentration of pollutant i in category k (e.g., wastewater, air pollutants)
C and the pre-specified standard by k i C . A firm is a compliant firm if the concentration of each pollutant in category k does not exceed the pre-specified national standard, that is,
The levy schedules differ between water and air pollution and across different regimes.
In the pre-2003 regime, as shown in the left part of figure 1, the levy on wastewater discharge for a compliant firm is based on the total volume of wastewater discharge (W) and the levy
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A uniform levy rate of ¥0.05 per ton of wastewater discharge was used in the pre-2003
regime. Figure 1 also illustrates the block levy rates paid by noncompliant firms in the 5 pre-2003 regime. Formally, the potential levy on pollutant i for a noncompliant firm is: table A1 for more details). The pulp paper sector, for example, is subject to looser standards for three main water pollutants, namely, COD, BOD (biochemical oxygen demand) and TSS (total suspended solids), than the textile and beverage sectors. BOD has a lower concentration standard than COD and TSS. The levy rates for COD, SO 2 , and TSS are shown to be decreasing block rates -¥0.18 per ton for within-standard discharge and ¥0.05 for the discharge higher than the standards for both COD and BOD; and the corresponding numbers are ¥0.03 and ¥0.01 for TSS. The amount of levy for water pollution that a noncompliant firm has to pay is the largest levy among all water pollutants:
where n is the total number of relevant water pollutants discharged by the firm.
In the case of air pollution, only noncompliant firms are subject to pollution levies. For air pollutant i, we denote the levy rate by 
where V is the total discharge of air pollutant i measured in cubic meters. Unlike the water pollution levy for noncompliant firms (see equation (2)), the air pollution levy is assessed on the absolute, rather than percentage, deviation from the concentration standard. Table A1 provides values of the key parameters for two common air pollutants, SO 2 and TSP (total suspended particles). A special regulation is imposed on SO 2 discharge among noncompliant firms in the acid rain and/or SO 2 control areas (including most coastal areas); however a uniform levy rate, ¥0.2 per kilogram of SO 2 emission, is applicable regardless of the concentration level.
The pre-2003 levy system has been greatly criticized. It lacks incentives or even provides disincentives to pollution control and abatement because of the decreasing block levy rates for water pollutants, air pollution levy being not applicable to compliant firms, and constant rates that are not adjusted for inflation (the real value of the later years was substantially lower than in the early years). The equivalent is calculated for all pollutants in each pollution type k, but only the top three pollutants with the greatest equivalent matter in calculating the levy amount:
where the levy rate R equals ¥0.7 per unit of COD equivalent and ¥0.6 per unit of SO 2 equivalent for the within-standard discharge, but the rates are doubled for the discharge higher than the standards, i.e., ¥1.4 and ¥1.2 for COD and SO 2 equivalent, respectively. In the case of air pollution, all polluting firms, whether they are a compliant or noncompliant firm, need to pay the levy. The rates are the same for firms located in the acid rain and SO 2 control area or other areas.
To illustrate the differences between the pre-and post-2003 levy systems, we assume there are two firms, one compliant firm and one noncompliant firm. As shown in Figure A1 for more details). The provincial control targets were then decomposed into the city/county level and finally to individual firms. For instance, a COD quota given to a firm was calculated by its total production in the base year of 2005 multiplied by the standard of wastewater discharged for each unit of production and then multiplied by the corresponding concentration standard of COD, where the standard of wastewater discharged per unit of production was designed to incorporate the local COD control target.
In order to achieve the quantity control targets for COD and SO 2 by the end of 2010, were used for voluntary pollution control. On the other hand, corporate performance rating and disclosure (PRD) reduces the information asymmetry between polluters and environmental stakeholders (e.g., consumers, communities, NGOs, investors), empowering 5 The pilot program of COD emission permit trading at Tai Lake involves 133 industrial firms and 75 wastewater treatment plants. The initial temporarily price is 4600 yuan per ton per year (see (Bi & Liu, 2009) these stakeholders to pressure polluters for improved environmental performance (Bui & Mayer, 2003; Foulon, Lanoie, & Laplante, 2002; Kennedy, Laplante, & Maxwell, 1994; Oberholzer-Gee & Mitsunari, 2006) . The literature has documented positive effects of PRD programs on regulatory compliance (Dasgupta, Wang, & Wheeler, 2007; García, Afsah, & Sterner, 2009; García, Sterner, & Afsah, 2007; Wang et al., 2004) . In 1999, China launched its first pilot program of PRD called Green Watch program in Zhenjiang City, Jiangsu
Province and Hohhot City, Inner Mongolia Autonomous District. The Green Watch Program rates firms' environmental performance from best to worst by five colors and discloses firms' color rating to the public. It improved the compliance rates and decreased pollution discharge and pollution intensity (Jin, Wang, & Wheeler, 2010; Wang et al., 2004) . Given the success of the public application for disclosure, the public may report this to the superior environmental authority and/or apply for administrative review or file administrative suits.
To promote corporate social responsibility (CSR) and to foster environmentally and socially sustainable private sector development, the stock markets in China took initiatives.
The We are not able to estimate the effectiveness of these most recently implemented policies because of the lack of data availability. Our empirical analyses mainly focus on the pollution levy system and the pollution quantity control. 
A brief literature review of pollution control in China
A rich literature investigates environmental regulations and industrial pollution control in China with a focus on the effectiveness of the levy system. The literature has documented a negative association between the levy rates and pollution discharge and/or pollution intensity based on either firm-level pollution data (Dasgupta, Laplante, Mamingi, & Wang, 2001; Wang & Jin, 2007; Wang, Mamingi, Laplante, & Dasgupta, 2003; Wang & Wheeler, 2005) or provincial data (Jiang & McKibbin, 2002) . Jiang and Mckibbin (2002) find that the pollution levy effectively reduces water pollution, air pollution, and solid wastes discharge.
The actual levy that a polluting firm pays (hereafter effective levy) may deviate from what it deserves to pay. Consequently, the effective levy rate, which is the actual levy payments divided by the total pollution discharge, may deviate from the official levy rate. The significant disparity in the effective levy rates may be due to differences in ownership structures, economic development, and strictness of environmental enforcement (Jiang & McKibbin, 2002; Wang & Wheeler, 2005 worse environmental performance compared with other firms. Wang and Wheeler (2005) show that relatively affluent, heavily industrialized coastal provinces had the highest effective levy rates for wastewater, while less developed inland provinces had the minimum rates in the pre-2003 regime. The region-variant levy rates play an important role when foreign 13 directed investment firms choose their location (Dean, Lovely, & Wang, 2009; Di, 2007) .
Different from the ex-post self-report in western countries, firms in China self-report their pollution discharge ex ante (Wang & Wheeler, 2005 it also faces a fixed amount of additional penalty. The total monetary penalty should not exceed the ceiling of ¥100,000 (around 16,000 USD). Other non-monetary penalty instruments are also available, such as revoking discharge licenses and shutting down facilities, but they are rarely used. The ex-ante self-report and limited penalties for a false report lead to weak enforcement (Lin, 2011; Wang & Wheeler, 2003) . For instance, firms can strategically underreport their pollution at the beginning of the year and decide whether to modify their report by observing whether they are inspected or not. To induce a truthful self-report, both expected and unexpected site-inspections are occasionally conducted by local environmental authorities. Dasgupta et al. (2001) show that the frequency of such inspections is negatively associated with firms' pollution levy. Lin (2011) provides a theoretical framework to support the effect of inspections in inducing truthful reporting among polluting firms and the empirical results confirm the expectation. 
The model
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. We first estimate technical efficiency using DEA and then investigate factors affecting technical efficiency and pollution intensity. We employ an R-package for DEA and Stata for regression analyses.
Estimation of technical efficiency
Technology and environmental management is an important determinant of pollution (Managi & Kaneko, 2009 We use a similar approach, but our focus is on the effectiveness of technical efficiency on pollution control.
DEA, developed by Charnes (1978) , is a nonparametric methodology for evaluating the relative efficiency of a set of comparable entities called decision making units (DMUs) with multiple inputs and outputs. It has gained popularity in environmental performance measure by incorporating undesired output (pollution) along with the desirable output (production) in the traditional DEA framework (Li, 2010; Zaim, 2004; Zhou, Ang, & Poh, 2008a , 2008b Zhou, Poh, & Ang, 2007) . See Zhou et al. (2008b) for a detailed review of DEA in energy and environmental studies. P1 suggests that the proportional reduction in desirable and undesirable outputs is feasible.
For example, to reduce pollution (undesirable output), a proportionate reduction in desirable output is needed. P2 implies that the production with only desirable outputs is impossible, and the only way to eliminate all undesirable outputs is to stop production.
Technical efficiency is the ability of a decision-maker to maximize output with given quantities of inputs and certain technology (output-oriented), or the ability to minimize input uses with a given output target (input-oriented). Output-oriented technical efficiency is commonly used. In particular, following Tyteca (1997) the technology efficiency for DMU i at time t is defined as
We define two types of outputs: the undesired environmental output that is denoted by Z and measured by COD-and SO 2 -equivalent emissions, and the desired output that is denoted by Y and measured by provincial gross industry productivity. The production inputs denoted by X consist of labor and capital. Equation (7) suggests an improvement in technology efficiency shifts the production possibility frontier (PPF) outwards since more can be produced from the same amount of inputs given the improvement. Following equation (7), the technical efficiency score (TES) of province i at time t is
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A greater TES implies higher technical efficiency.
We then investigate provincial variations of technical efficiency by employing econometric models. We assume that technical efficiency in province i at time t denoted by TE it is a function of input prices (PXit) consisting of labor wage and capital cost, pollution control variables (levy rates and quantity control targets) represented by Q it , province-specific economic factors (M it ), region-specific time trends (γ i ), and province effects (θ i ). The reduced structural equation for technical efficiency is (9) .
We expect β 1 to be positive as a higher input price is expected to provide an incentive for being more technically efficient. We also expect β 2 to be positive as a higher levy rate or a larger quantity control target also gives firms an incentive to improve technical efficiency so that the undesirable output (pollution) can be reduced. The province-specific economic factors include the percentage of the population ages 15 and above who have at least tertiary education, GDP per capita, and ownership structures (measured by share of GDP contributed by state-owned enterprises, collectively owned enterprises, foreign investment, and private companies). We expect that technical efficiency relates to investment in research and technology (Ahmad & Bravo-Ureta, 1996; Nishimizu & Page, 1982) , but such data is not available in the 1990s. We use the annual count of patent applications as a proxy for investment in research and technology.
Investigating the role of the pollution control system and technical efficiency
We use the following reduced form to investigate the effectiveness of technical efficiency, pollution control instruments, and prices of production inputs on pollution intensity:
where ijt S is the intensity of either COD or SO 2 equivalent discharge (index by j) in province i at time t and it TE is the estimated technical efficiency. Equation (10) is consistent with the three emission determinants proposed by Grossman (1995) and Grossman and Krueger (1991) : (a) the scale effect that measures change in economic activity represented by the provincial economic variables such as gross output; (b) the composition effect that measures the structural economic changes, substitutions between inputs, and the tradeoff between inputs and undesirable output; (c) the technique effect that measures changes in energy/resource intensity and represented by technical efficiency. Equation (10) estimates the effect of key variables of interest on pollution intensity, including φ for technical efficiency; α's for effective levy rates of water and air pollution, the pollution quantity control targets, and pollution abatement costs.
The data
We rely on various China Statistics Yearbooks for province-level economic data and China Overall, the provincial average GDP per capita is approximately ¥2,300. The state-owned enterprises contributed more than half of industry output, followed by privately owned companies (15%), collectedly owned (10%), and foreign invested companies (7%).
Approximately 20% achieve at least tertiary education. See Table A3 for the summary statistics of the economic and pollution variables.
We measure pollution intensity by COD equivalent of water pollutants and SO 2 equivalent of air pollutants per million gross industrial output values. On average, for each million output value, approximately four tons of COD equivalent, and ten tons of SO2 equivalent was discharged (see table A3 ). As shown in figure 2(a) , the data clearly show a declining trend of pollution intensity. The COD intensity decreased by more than 80% from 
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The literature has documented a significant regional disparity of the effective levy rates in the 1990s (Jiang & McKibbin, 2002; Wang & Wheeler, 2003 . of SO 2 equivalent in Guangxi to ¥1.13 in Shanxi. However, the significant disparity in the effective levy rates does not necessarily imply that the system was ineffective. The disparity may be responsive to ambient quality and economic development, thus reflecting cost efficiency of pollution abatement (Jiang & McKibbin, 2002; Wang & Wheeler, 2005) . 
Insert Figure 3 here!

Results and Discussion
Estimated technical efficiency
Insert Figure 4 here!
Following equation (9) (p-value = 0.000) (see Table 2 ). We therefore conclude that the FE model fits the data better and mainly discuss the estimation results of the FE model.
GDP per capita is likely to be endogenous. For example, the possible omitted variable for research and development investment may affect GDP per capita. We use a panel IV fixed effects model to control for potential endogeneity of GDP per capita, where the instruments we proposed are national GDP per capita and openness to trade measured by the ratio of total imports and exports to gross GDP. Several statistical tests are performed to validate the instruments (see Table 2 ). First, the LM version of the Anderson canonical correlation test (Anderson, 1951) rejects the null hypothesis of under-identification, which suggests that two instrument variables are correlated with GDP per capita. Second, the Sargan-Hansen test is conducted to test for over-identifying restrictions. The result provides a strong evidence that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The test results for under-identification and over-identification suggest the proposed instrument variables meet the relevance and exogeneity conditions. However, the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic (7.58) is smaller than the critical value at the 10% 21 significance level (19.93) and, thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments.
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The results suggest that wage has a positive effect, but capital cost has a negative effect on technical efficiency, while both effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. The above findings suggest that an increase of wage and/or a decrease in capital cost is associated with an improvement in technical efficiency. The results may partially explain that the West region is found to be lower in technical efficiency, but more labor and pollution intensive than the East region. The total number of employees per unit of gross output value and pollution intensity of SO 2 equivalent in the West region was more than triple that in the East region, but technical efficiency was lower by 28% on average. We find no statistically significant effect of the quantity control targets on technical efficiency. The effective levy rate for air pollution has a statistically significant effect on technical efficiency -the higher the effective levy rate, the higher the technical efficiency. However, the effective rate of water pollution is not statistically significant. Table 2 also shows that GDP per capita has a positive, statistically significant effect on technical efficiency, which suggests that the more economically advanced provinces tend to have higher technical efficiency. We find that the percent of GPD contributed by different ownership structures has no statistical difference in technical efficiency with only one exception for foreign investment. Technical efficiency is lower if a greater share of GDP is contributed by foreign investment compared with that by state owned enterprises. Another surprising result is that annual number of patent applications is statistically and negatively associated with technical efficiency at the 10% level.
Estimation results on intensity of COD-and SO 2 -equivalent
Based on the specification in equation (10) Second, in both estimations we use the first lag of GDP per capita in logarithm to avoid endogeneity.
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We can draw the following conclusion based on the estimation results presented in table 3. First, pollution control instruments are found to be effective in reducing pollution intensity.
Both the effective levy rate and the pollution quantity control targets have a negative, statistically significant effect on pollution intensity except the effective levy rate for the COD intensity (negative but insignificant). Other than these two main pollution control instruments, the regime change does not lead to statistically significant differences in pollution intensity in statistically significant effect on pollution intensity for both COD and SO 2 . Third, input prices play important roles. The higher the labor cost and/or the lower the capital cost, the higher the pollution intensity. However, pollution abatement cost does not have a statistically significant effect on pollution intensity. Table 3 also suggests that a high income level is associated with lower pollution intensity, as shown by the coefficient of first lag of GDP per capita in logarithm.
Conclusions and policy implications
Using the provincial economic and pollution data in China, we first estimate technical efficiency using the DEA approach and then investigate the role of technical efficiency, price of production inputs, and policy instruments, namely, pollution levy and pollution quantity 23 control, on pollution intensity. The results suggest significant regional differences in technical efficiency, effective levy rates, and provincial targets of total pollution quantity control. We also show that prices of production inputs play important roles in both technical efficiency and pollution intensity. Technical efficiency is higher if there is an increase in the effective pollution levy rate (of air pollution) or labor wage, or a decrease in capital cost. On the other hand, technical efficiency, the effective levy rates, pollution quantity control targets, and capital cost have a negative effect but wage has a positive effect on pollution intensity of both COD and SO 2 .
This study offers the following contribution to the literature. First, to our knowledge it is the first study to explicitly investigate technical efficiency in pollution intensity in the context of China, as previous studies have used time trends to control for technical efficiency and changes. Second, the majority of previous studies utilize the data in the pre-2003 regime and focus on one policy instrument, the levy system. With the expansion of the data, we are able to convert pollution discharge into COD and SO 2 equivalent and investigate the effectiveness of two main pollution control instruments, the levy system and total quantity control. From this standpoint, this study provides a more complete analysis and offers broader policy implications.
This study provides the following policy implications. First, pollution quantity control effectively reduces pollution intensity but it does not improve technical efficiency. We speculate that one of the main approaches to meet the quantity control target is to shut down large polluters, which leads to reduced pollution intensity but no change in technical efficiency. On the other hand, the effective levy rates for air pollution are associated with improvement in both pollution intensity and technical efficiency. Pollution levy, a market-based instrument, may work better than command-based instruments like pollution quantity control as it gives polluters an incentive to improve technical efficiency that will 24 lead to a long-run improvement in pollution control. Second, the prices of production inputs play important roles in technical efficiency and pollution intensity, which provide alternative channels for China to control industrial pollution. On the other hand, it also cautions the government of the unintended consequence on the environment if any policy changes are made relating to labor and capital costs. We assume the total amount of wastewater discharge is 500,000 tons in both examples. The pollutant discharge is the total wastewater discharge multiplied by the concentration of the corresponding pollutant. The conversion parameters for COD (chemical oxygen demand), BOD (biochemical oxygen demand), and TSS (total solid suspend) are one, half, and four, respectively. Asterisks, ***, **, and *, stand for the one, five, and ten percent of statistical significance.
1.
The excluded instruments for provincial GDP per capita are national GDP per capita and opened to trade measured by the ratio of total imports and exports to the gross GDP. Asterisks, ***, **, and *, stand for the one, five, and ten percent of statistical significance. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
(a).
The levy and total amount control are specific for COD-or SO 2-equivalent. Similarly, pollution abatement costs refer to water pollution abatement costs for COD intensity; and air pollution abatement for SO 2 intensity. Emission trading (experimental) Two compliance policy 5 Subsidies for energy-saving products Environmental compensation fee Credit Restrcitions to heavy polluters 1 EIA was first introduced in Clause 6 of the 1979 Provinsional Environmental Protection Law and was formally required to carry out by an administrative order from National Environment Projection Commission in 1981. All new firms or new production project are required to complete an EIA depending to the nature and size of the proposed project/firm.
2
The TSP requires that the design, construction, and operation of a new production facility be synchronized with the design, construction, and operation of appropriate waste treatment facilities. A new production facility or a production line cannot be put into operation without a certification of the TSP issued by from SEPA. Jing and Mckibbin (2002) argues that this policy instrumnet may not contribute to environmental protection as firms may shut down the waste treatment facilities after granted the certification.
3
The LTT policy orders a limited time for non-compliant, heavy polluting firms to treat their pollution to meet the standard and come into compliance. If the requirement is not met, the firm will be orderedt o temporarily halt its production, or face shut-down or relocation. 4 Cnetralized Pollution Control provides economies of scale and is cost effective and, thus, is greatly encouraged (Jiang & McKibbin, 2002). 5 Two Compliance Policy requires firms in compliance with both discharge standards and ambient standards. This instrument suggests the emphasis shift from pollutant concentration-based control to pollutant mass-based control. 6 Pollution Report and Discharge Permit System requires individual firms report their pollution discharge to local environmetnal authorities and the authorities then issue a pollution discharge permit to each firm. No market has emerged to trade the discharge permit in Chian. 7 The government leaders at the different levels sign an environmental protection control contract to raise their environmental awareness. 8 AUEQ is conducted annually and the results are assessble to the public through different channels including media. The aim is to impose public pressure on local government to improve environmental quality and to raise environmental awareness among the public. total quantity control (%) a n h u i b e i j i n g c h o n g q in g f u j i a n g a n s u g u a n g d o n g g u a n g x i g u i z h o u h a i n a n h e b e i h e i l o n g j i a n g h e n a n h u b e i h u n a n j i a n g s u j i a n g x i j i l i n l i a o n i n g n e i m e n g g u n i n g x i a q i n g h a i s h a n d o n g s h a n g h a i s h a n x i s ic h u a n t ia n j i n x in ji a n g x iz a n g y u n n a n z h e j i a n g COD SO2
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